技能 2026-08-22 00:25 UTC
llm-sast-scannerlatest
版本【latest】由提交人 SunWeb3Sec 提交,主要更新类型为:功能特性新增与扩展。提交说明:sink-first sweep and under-reporting guardrails。为项目引入了新的能力与模块支持。
Commit提交信息原文
sink-first sweep and under-reporting guardrails
Driven by a confirmed miss: two scans of a Spring Boot repo failed to
find a CWE-22/CWE-73 arbitrary file write that an inline scan caught.
Root cause was not a missing pattern — `new File(tainted)` was already
documented in path_traversal_lfi_rfi.md. Four workflow gaps hid it:
1. Source-first-only tracing. The target had 369 Java files but only
8 filesystem sinks; forward taint from hundreds of request params
never converged. Backward from 8 sinks hits it deterministically.
2. The path traversal reference was framed almost entirely around
reading files, so a write primitive read as "not exploitable".
3. The taint passed through a helper named `createFileName` whose
safe branch was the fall-through and whose early return passed
user input through untouched — credited as a sanitizer on its name.
4. The endpoint was admin-authenticated, so trusted-role suppression
rules dropped it.
SKILL.md:
- Step 3 is now bidirectional. Pass A (sink-first sweep) is mandatory
and runs first, with a per-language sink table. Every sink must be
dispositioned TAINTED / CONSTANT / UNREACHED and reported — a scan
that does not state its sink count has not completed Pass A.
- Added decoy-sanitizer rule: never infer sanitization from a name;
the supplied-value branch is the attacker's branch.
- Added cross-layer/@Async continuation rule, including re-derived
arguments (caller computes a sanitized local, then passes the raw
source anyway).
- New Under-Reporting Guardrails section that overrides the existing
~30 suppression rules: authority escalation beats trusted-role
suppression (an admin may export a CSV, not choose its path on
disk); constrained impact (forced extension, no read-back, no RCE
chain) is not grounds to suppress; benign-sounding parameter names
are not grounds to suppress.
references/path_traversal_lfi_rfi.md:
- New Arbitrary File Write (CWE-73) section: write-side sink inventory
across Java/Python/Node/.NET, detection rules (bare relative paths
are worse not safer; `resolve()`/`Path.Combine` are not sanitizers),
four-level impact model that does not require an RCE chain, and the
full worked example.
Regression: rescanning the target now reports both sinks CONFIRMED with
a complete 8-sink inventory, and correctly drops a third candidate as a
false positive with cited evidence.